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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this analysis is to discover whether the Leadership and
Management Education and Training (LMET) of supervisory personnel in Navy
commands is systematically related to measures of effectiveness (MOEs) such as
exercise and inspection scores, Unit Status and Identity Report (UNITREP) combat
readiness ratings, personnel retention, etc. The two focal questions of interest are: do
increased proportions of LMET trained officers and enlisted supervisors relate to
improved readiness and effectiveness; and does the length of time since having LMET
"dilute" the effects of having had the course?
A. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
The first chapter is an Introduction discussing the purpose of the thesis and
describing the elements of the study. Chapter II briefly chronicles the historical
aspects and development of LMET. Previous research in LMET and shipboard
measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are discussed in Chapter III. The techniques used in
data collection and analysis are the subjects of Chapter IV. In Chapter V, results are
presented in the form of correlation coefficients between MOEs and 1) percentages of
supervisory personnel onboard with LMET and 2) average length of time since
personnel have been LMET trained. Chapter V also deals with the relative significance
of the data. Chapter VI presents the authors' interpretation of results and limitations
in applying them. Conclusions and recommendations for improving the Navy's
leadership program are discussed, as are recommendations for further research.
B. DEFINITION OF LMET
LMET is a formal, Navy specific training program designed to prepare
supervisors and managers for leadership and management positions at key (threshold)
points in their careers. LMET is based on research done by McBer and Company, of
effective Navy leader behavior (as is discussed in Chapter II) and focuses on specific
skills and individual initiative. LMET is now taught at 21 sites to about 30,000 Navy
personnel each year. In fiscal year 1980 LMET cost the Navy about S17 million
[Ref. 11
'p. 207' in 1986 the approximate cost of LMET was S21 million. 1 There are 19
varieties of the course—each geared to the appropriate level in the chain of command
(i.e. Leading Petty Officer, Senior Officer) and tailored to the warfare or staff
community (surface, aviation, medical, supply) [Ref. 2: p. vi]. LMET uses lecture, case
studies, role playing, simulations, small group discussions, instrumented feedback (self
assessment questionnaires), and individual written and reading assignments to convey
to participants leadership competencies. 2 [Ref. 2: p. 39]
C. BASIS FOR RESEARCH
Both authors of this thesis have attended LMET, LCDR Polley in 1981 and LT
Cissell in 1982. They found it to be interesting and helpful to them. Their interest in
researching this topic was encouraged by a request from NMPC-62 to analyze the
relationship between LMET and unit effectiveness.
An article published in Navy Times earlier this year [Ref. 4], discussed a study
sponsored by Naval Military Personnel Command (NMPC-62) Leadership and
Command Effectiveness Division [Ref. 5] on what percent of their time Navy personnel
spend in each of three areas: Technical Tasks, Leadership and Management. The
study also asked its 983 respondents how well prepared they were for these tasks. The
study found the individuals perceived themselves to be spending more time on
leadership and management tasks than technical tasks as early as E-6. Findings also
showed that a significant majority of respondents felt less prepared for leadership and
management tasks than for technical tasks. An unnamed source in the Navy Times
article said, "We're (the Navy's) just not spending enough time and energy on
leadership." "Only 21,000 enlisted persons a year-nine percent of the 240,000 in
paygrades E-5 through E-9-go through LMET. Considering turnover,. ..that figure is
appallingly low."
If LMET can be more directly tied to those criteria that are considered to be
valid measures of effectiveness and readiness, then perhaps more effort will be made to
ensure that more supervisors and managers receive the training before they enter a
leadership position. If LMET does not relate to command effectiveness, then what
specific areas of LMET should be targeted for reform?
information supplied by NMPC-62.
2 A competency, as McBer defines it, is "a knowledge, skill, ability, motive, or
other characteristic that can be demonstrated to relate directly to competent
occupational performance" [Ref. 3].
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In 1986 about 7,500 officers and 20,800 enlisted personnel attended LMET. 3
Most attended through some training pipeline; that is, they went to the training as part
of a string of schools scheduled between duty stations. LMET is required for all
supervisory leadership personnel (E5 - 05) prior to assignment to:
a) arduous sea duty,
b) unaccompanied overseas shore duty,
c) unaccompanied non-rotational sea duty, or
d) neutral duty (neither sea nor shore duty).
This requirement may be waived if 1) operational commitments override; 2) no quota is
available; 3) the member is going from one outus (outside continental United States)
billet to another; or, 4) that person has already attended LMET. 4 In addition to those
attending LMET between duty assignments, about one-third of LMET seats are filled
by TAD (temporary additional duty) students. These are people who come to LMET
from a unit and then return to that same unit after the training.
LMET, as it exists now, lasts one week (as in the case of Basic and Advanced
Division Officer LMET), two weeks (as in Leading Petty Officer (LPO) and Leading
Chief Petty Officer (LCPO) courses), or just two days (as in the case of the Command
Effectiveness Seminar). LMET, in its present form, is best described as an
evolutionary form of the original LMET course designed in cooperation with McBer
and Co. around 1977. Chapter II discusses the events leading to the development of
LMET and why it was needed.
3 Information supplied by NMPC-62.




Good leadership is essential to the effectiveness of any organization. One finds,
however, little agreement among scholars, researchers, or practitioners as to what
leadership is, much less how to define good leadership. Definitions and theories range
from those focusing on an individual's personality and genetic traits to those describing
leadership more as a process involving interaction between organizational purpose and
individual behavior.
Competent military leadership is essential to the effectiveness of each military
unit as well as to the success of the U.S. Defense Department in accomplishing its
goals. Military organizations have unique missions which often require humans to
perform tasks which might otherwise be considered inappropriate, immoral, or even
unlawful in any other setting. The military also may require submission to stricter
rules, adverse environmental conditions, and any number of tasks contrary to personal
preference. The men and women in the armed services are expected to perform ever
more diverse and demanding tasks with existing or often fewer resources. The future
role of the Navy as well as that of other services will place increasing pressure on
military leaders to do more and better with less. The shape of the future, because it
points to increased technology, automation, and reduced manning levels, only sharpens
the need for Navy officers and senior NCOs to acquire requisite leadership and
management skills.
In seeking those skills encompassed by leadership and management, one must
first understand the concepts: how do key people in the Navy define leadership and
management? In a June 1987 conference on leadership held at the United States Naval
Academy5 VADM William Rowden, Commander Naval Sea Systems Command,
distinguished leadership from management by defining leadership as "the ability to
motivate people" and management as "a process of getting things done" [Ref. 6: p. 3].
Also at the conference, Professor Ben Schneider, University of Maryland, made a
'On June 10-12, 1987, the Naval Academy and Navy Personnel Research and
Development Center (NPRDC) co-sponsored a conference on leadership. There were
90 participants and 35 speakers. Twelve active and retired flag officers attended
included ADM Trost, Chief of Naval Operations. Several academic researchers in the
leadership field spoke as did the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy.
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similar distinction: leadership is "energizing and directing others" and management is
"a process of getting things done" [Ref. 6: p. 3]. Admiral Rowden also said that
management is more easily learned than leadership. Perhaps this is because there is
greater agreement over what management is while leadership still exists in a haze of
theory and disagreement.'=*
B. HISTORY OF NAVY LEADERSHIP TRAINING
Since World War II, the Navy has focused most of its training efforts on the
individual as he. she first enters the service. Some highly technical ratings/designators
require that the service member attend as much as eighteen months of classroom and
practical training before being assigned to his/her first experience tour. Leadership and
Human Resources Management topics are typically included in Academy curricula,
recruit training, Officer Candidate School classes and at other "source" schools.
Leadership training did not, however, receive serious consideration until the 1950s
when symptoms such as a proportionally large brig population prompted action by the
Secretary of the Navy to "shore up" leadership deficiencies [Ref. 1: p. 197]. In 1958,
General Order 21 was issued. It defined leadership6 and ordered Commanding Officers
to incorporate leadership training into their command training plans. With minimal
real change resulting from the order, it was re-issued in 1963 but again was ineffective
perhaps due to the lack of assistance or specific guidance given to commanding officers
[Ref. 1: p. 198]. In 1966, leadership training was incorporated into General Military
Training (GMT). Each sailor was to receive ten hours per year in leadership style,
chain of command, authority, responsibility, and accountability. 7 With standard lesson
plans and material, leadership training was scheduled five times annually along with
venereal disease prevention and blood donorship.
In 1970, then Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Zumvvalt, laid the
groundwork, for the Human Goals Program, later to be called Human Resources
Management Support System, which encompassed leadership training, racial
awareness, drug and alcohol counseling, and overseas diplomacy. A new two-week
6 Leadership is the art of accomplishing the Navy's mission through people. It is
the sum of those qualities of intellect, of human understanding and of moral character
that enable a man to inspire and to manage a group of people successfully. Effective
leadership, therefore, is based on personal example, good management practices, and
moral responsibility. [Ref. 7]
7 With the exception of leadership style, these topics are now taught in an eight
hour command level workshop: "Military Rights and Responsibilities."
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formal, external (to the command), Leadership and Management Training (LMT)
course represented the leadership portion of the new program. It was authorized to be
taught at fifteen sites, but the demand for quotas exceeded the supply and "bootleg"
versions of the course were created (over 150 unauthorized courses) [Ref. 8].
In August 1974, shortly after he relieved ADM Zumwalt as CNO, ADM
Holloway ordered a review of all officer and enlisted leadership and management
training. The Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET) convened a panel
headed by CAPT Carl Auel (Chaplain Corps) assisted by Fred Fiedler (a scholar in the
leadership field). Over a three month period, the panel examined earlier and existing
leadership training and proposed a method for designing an "ideal" training model.
Their report refered to development of a system, not a course, implying that much
more than a single course would be necessary to correct the leadership training
program. "Without an LMET system, the first phase of which is a clear and
comprehensive definition of requirements by line managers, any further expansion,
consolidation, or reprogramming of current training efforts would meet fleet needs at
the level of chance." [Ref. 9: p. iv]
It was in 1975 that McBer and Co. became involved in the Navy Human
Resources Management Program. McBer, a Boston-based consulting firm established
by Dr. David C. McClelland and David Berlew in 1970 [Ref. 10: pp. 35 & 39], was
contracted to improve the effectiveness of Human Resource Management (HRM)
Specialists. McClelland, a Harvard psychologist, had focused much of his work on
improving the screening process for hiring employees. He found that in many
organizations, the tests they were using to screen applicants tested for academic
potential rather than for skills that would be reflected in job proficiency. McClelland
believes that people should be hired and trained based upon competencies.
"Competencies are not aspects of the job but characteristics of the people who do their
job best." [Ref. 10: p. 40]
After identifying what behaviors superior HRM specialists demonstrate better or
more often than average specialists do, McBer devised a training model based on
"competencies" [Ref. 11]. McClelland's theories on competencies and how they relate
to achievement are explained in further detail in The Achieving Society [Ref. 12] and
"Testing for Competence Rather Than for 'Intelligence'" [Ref. 13].
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McBer's approach-to sample (using Behavioral Event Interviews)8 high
performers and average performers to train people to do those things that separate
high performers from their peers-had both scientific and practical appeal to the Navy.
In January 1976, after abandoning internal efforts to develop a new leadership training
program, and under high level pressure to produce tangible results, several civilian
contractors were asked for proposals. The unconventional approach of McBer was
selected. Using the same technique employed in the Navy HRM Project, McBer
analyzed the results of interviews with Navy supervisory personnel previously
categorized by thier commanding officers as either superior or average leaders.
[Ref. 1: pp. 204 & 205] In 1976, McBer began sampling Navy Leading Petty Officers,
Chief Petty Officers, and Commissioned Officers first on the West Coast and then on
the East Coast. Their first model included twenty-seven competencies. In 1978 and
1979, pilot courses were taught by Navy instructors and evaluated by System
Development Corporation [Ref. 16]. Evidently, these early courses were based on all
twenty-seven competencies. To validate their findings, McBer later sampled 1,000
Navy officers and enlisted personnel using nine tests to measure competency elements.
Behavioral Event Interviews were also conducted on a subset of 100 testees. Sixteen of
the original twenty-seven competencies were found to be significantly related to
superior leadership in the validation phase. These sixteen competencies, listed in Table
1. are now the backbone of most of the current LMET courses.
The premise behind LMET is that the sixteen competencies can be learned, and
increased use of the competencies will lead to better leadership and management and
hence improved effectiveness. LMET competencies are acquired through a five-step
process:
1. Recognition (identifying knowledge, skills, values, etc. present in
cases incidents)
2. Understanding (integration and connection with one's own experience)
3. Self Assessment in Relation to the Competency (discovery of one's own level in
each competency and identification of areas for specific improvement)
4. Skill Acquisition and Practice (practical exercises/classroom applications)
->>
] Behavioral Event Interviews are similar in technique to the Critical Incident
Interview developed by Flannagan during WWII [Ref. 14], Each subject is asked to
describe in detail unsuccessful and successful events in his, her career. Thorough
probing by the interviewer leads to a clear account of what lead to the event, who
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5. Job Application (classroom feedback and identification of goals, action steps,
and obstacles on one's next job) [Ref. 15].
Initially LMET was taught at five levels: 1) Commanding and Executive
Officers, 2) Department Heads, 3) Division Officers, 4) Leading Chief Petty Officers
(LCPOs), and 5) Leading Petty Officers and at two sites: Little Creek, VA and
Coronado, CA. Since then, LMET sites have expanded to 21 locations. LMET has
since been tailored to the specific needs of each of the warfare communities as well as
to staff commuunities such as Navy Medical Command (NAVMED). [Ref. 2: pp. vi
and 43-48]
In 1983, a resurvey by McBer consultants essentially validated the "Fleet
Competency Model" with some modification on earlier competencies. Improvements
in their methodology also allowed specification of the type of situation a given "critical
incident'' was observed in. This allowed training to focus on how one might deal with
a variety of situations, i.e., when to employ which competencies. [Ref. 2: pp. 50-51]
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More recently, the Command Effectiveness Study9 results have had an impact on
LMET content, particularly the courses for Prospective Commanding and Executive
Officers (now replaced by the Command Effectiveness Seminar) and the LCPO course.
Essentially LMET has been shaped not only by the initial research done by McBer, but
also by feedback from participants, evaluations made by observers, and subsequent
research.
LMET is now the approved method for Naval leadership and management
training. The course components have not, however, been systematically included in
Naval Academy curricula, Officer Candidate School classes, or Navy Reserve Officer
Training Corps (NROTC) requirements.
9The results of the Command Effectiveness Study are discussed in Chapter III.
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW
In a memorandum for the record by Naval Military Personnel Command,
NMPC-6, dated December 7, 1978, an evaluation plan for LMET was laid out in four
phases:
1. A review of LMET to date
2. Course validation
3. LMET delivery to the Navy
4. LMET evaluation
Phase four called for a longitudinal evaluation of the impact of LMET on both
individuals and their organizations. While several efforts have been made to discover
the impact on individuals (as discussed in the following section) no evidence was found
that any thorough study has been done to discover the impact LMET has had on
organizational effectiveness.
A. PREVIOUS EVALUATIONS OF LMET
1. NPRDC/ONR/NPGS (1977)
McBer's initial work, in identifying competencies and designing the training
was scrutinized by several professionals among whom were Dr. R. F. Morrison of
Navy Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC), Dr. B. T. King of the
Office of Naval Research (ONR), and Dr.s C. K. Eoyang and R. S. Elster of the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPGS). Some of their concerns were:
• a very small, unrepresentative sample (n= 36) in developing the 27 competencies
(King and Elster)
• reliance on supervisor evaluations and behavioral event interview results (rather
than including direct observation and peer and subordinate perceptions) (King
and Eoyang)
• inappropriate coding techniques (1 = attribute present regardless of how often;
= attribute not present, i.e. wasn't brought up in the interview) (Morrison)
• shaky statistical techniques:
* multiple regression used to "predict" superior performance ratings using 27
competencies (independent variables) for such a small sample (King)
* multicolinearity of variables (Eoyang)
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* factor analysis using two few cases (Morrison)
* significance testing at the .10 level (King) 10
After such sharp criticisms, it is surprising that LMET ever got off the ground.
It would appear that McBer's competencies, however arrived at, intuitively appealed to
reviewers and are similar to other characteristics of successful leaders such as those
found in the Handbook of Leadership, by Stogdill.
2. SDC (1979)
Between May 1978 and May 1979, System Development Corporation (SDC)
evaluated LMET pilot courses for Leading Petty Officers (LPOs), Leading Chief Petty
Officers (LCPOs), Prospective Commanding and Executive Officers (PCO/PXO) and
LMET instructors. Objectives of the assessment were: (1) to perform on-site
evaluations of the delivery of the courses; (2) to review instructor guides and student
journals; and (3) to provide specific recommendations for management decisions
concerning the assignment of Navy instructors to deliver the courses.
The SDC assessment was not intended to measure impact of the training on
subsequent performance, but did attempt to discover whether students were receptive
to the course material and absorbing any of it. A sample of SDC's findings:
• Navy instructors were in need of training in facilitation techniques.
• Course materials needed to be "de-civilianized", that is, made more suited to
military needs and situations.
• Participants enjoyed the courses.
• Time boundaries limited the ability to use very many practical exercises.
• SDC recommended courses be standardized and offered to all targeted levels of
Navy personnel. [Ref. 16]
It is interesting to note that SDC also participated with McBer in the data
gathering phase of the LMET project [Ref. 3]. Their expertise in LMET design is
useful; however, one might question their complete objectivity as they may have had
some stake in the success of LMET.
10 Excerpted from memorandums written by Dr. Morrison, Dr. King, Dr. Elster,
and Dr. Eoyang in response to requests to review McBer's research. These memos
were supplied by Dr. Carson K. Eoyang, PERSEREC, from his personal files.
11 These characteristics include but are not limited to: intelligence, energy,
judgement decisiveness, integrity, achievement drive, dominance, drive for
responsibility, initiative, sociability, assertiveness, emotional balance and control, and
ability to enlist cooperation. [Ref. IS: pp. 74-75].
19
3. Davies(1980)
In his thesis Davies discussed the need for the Army to evaluate its leadership
training. He presents an extensive review of the leadership theories contributing to the
Army's organizational leadership model, their training programs, and the leadership
training of the other services.
In his discussion of the development of the Navy's LMET program, Davies
traces the evolution from the early 1970s when the Navy had 157 different leadership
courses through the research by the McBer Company which identified the sixteen
competencies which form the basis of the current LMET courses. He also notes that
there has been no formal evaluation of LMET, although at the time of his work (1980)
the Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET) was "progressing toward an
internal evaluation plan to determine whether the course is actually teaching what it
was designed to teach." [Ref 19]
As discussed by Davies and elsewhere in this thesis, the evaluation of LMET
is complicated by the lack of a control group within the Navy. This is because the
Navy has adopted the policy of not denying LMET training to any personnel for the
purpose of establishing a control group.
In presenting his recommendations, Davies proposed two separate plans, the
organizational leadership training evaluation plan and the Army's Leadership and
Management Development Course evaluation plan. Within each of these areas he
offered specific objectives and steps to measure the achievement of the objectives. One
of his lower echelon divisions is organizational performance for which the stated
objective is: to determine if the leadership training program is reflected in changes in
the operational performance of the units to which the newly trained leaders are
assigned. Although this objective roughly parallels the purpose of this thesis, there are
numerous and significant differences between the Army's program and the Navy's
LMET program, thus precluding further development along the path which Davies has
laid out. For example, the Army takes a decentralized approach for its Leadership and
Management Development Course, allowing these experience based workshops to flow
according to the needs and backgrounds of the individuals attending. Whereas the
Navy has adopted a strict, centrally controlled format for its LMET courses.
In summary, Davies achieves his stated purpose of raising the question of
evaluation of the Army's leadership program and of offering a plan whereby the issue
oi' trainins effectiveness can be studied. That such an ambitious evaluation scheme as
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he proposes will ever be undertaken by the Army or any other agency is questionable
because such an evaluation would require a high level of commitment including several
million dollars for the research effort alone.
4. Parker (1981)
Donald F. Parker is a retired Navy Captain and (in 1981 when this reference
was published) was Assistant Professor of Organizational Behavior and Industrial
Relations in the Graduate School of Business Administration at the University of
Michigan. Immediately preceding his retirement from the Navy he was CO of the
Navy Personnel Research and Development Center. In a chapter he wrote for Military
Leadership [Ref. 1], Parker reviews the events leading up to LMET development, the
research upon which LMET is based, and LMET course design and delivery.
The following are some of the findings and conclusions made by Parker:
• LMET could have been developed with internal expertise.
• LMET was not designed with a clear comprehensive definition of requirements
as was recommended by a panel headed by Chaplain Auel [Ref. 9].
• LMET was not developed under the Interservice Procedures for Instructional
Systems Development (ISD) which Parker believes led to inadequate learning
objectives; inconsistencies between tests, instruction material, and stated
objectives; and difficulty in measuring the success of the training.
• Analysis for LMET design was "deficient with respect to concept definition,
research design, data collection, data analysis and interpretation" [Ref. 1: p 198].
• LMET courses don't include the concept of contingency
,
i.e., how to select
appropriate behaviors in differing situations.
From his observations of classroom training, Parker found that the flow from
lecture to discussion to small group activities helped to maintain student interest and
provided frequent opportunities for students to express their opinions and trade ideas
with peers. He found that in practice LMET instruction differed somewhat from class
to class and location to location as instructors sought to motivate each group. He also
found that the course was well accepted by students. [Ref. 1: pp. 207-208]
5. Vandover and Villarosa (1981)
In 1981 Vandover and Villarosa, two Naval Postgraduate School students,
interviewed a cross section of 51 LMET graduates and their immediate supervisors and
subordinates from 13 operational commands. In their pilot study for evaluation they
sought to discover any improvements over non-graduates in the knowledge or behavior
of LMET graduates. They found no systematic link between LMET and leadership
related behavior changes. However, some of the trends they discovered include:
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Seniority of graduates appeared to negatively correlate with behavior change.
Evidence of behavioral changes as a result of attending LMET were greatest
among Leading Petty Officers (LPO's) and lowest among Chief Petty Officers
(CPO's).
People who were marginal performers before the training, experienced more
impact from the course.
Knowledge familiarity with LMET competencies seems to deteriorate after as
little as six months following training.
Graduates' perceptions of their own improvement after training were not
validated by their supervisors and subordinates.
Graduates who were members of high-performing, effective units were more
likely to have shown behavioral improvements after training. [Ref. 20]
6. Abe and Babylon (1982)
Using McBer's Behavioral Event Interview technique, Abe and Babylon, two
Naval Postgraduate School students "...sought to find if the specific competency of
delegation is more often demonstrated by superior Navy personnel and if LMET
training has any significant impact upon managerial effectiveness and the use of
delegation".
They found no relationship between LMET attendance and use of delegation.
Superior performers did not use delegation more than average performers. LMET
graduates were equally distributed among superior and average performers. One
statement they made was particularly astounding: "The fact that delegation is taught
in LMET but not used in daily performance could also be used to suggest that the
Navy is an unfavorable environment in which to practice the skills learned in LMET"
[Ref. 21].
Perhaps LMET's design by civilian consultants, who had very little Navy
specific experience, has resulted in training unsuited for the Navy environment (or as
LCDR Foley suggests [Ref. 22], unsupported by unit effectiveness).
7. Foley (1983)
Another Naval Postgraduate School student, LCDR Patricia Foley,
interviewed 70 LMET graduates seeking to discover what incentives and constraints
affect the utilization of LMET competencies. She found no statistical differences
between LMET graduates and the control group. Through her interviews, she found




Leadership example as set by superior
Communications flow
Attitude towards inspections (short sightedness)
Lack of emphasis on subordinate development
No support by senior members of the command
Lack of a reward system for competency use
Those who had demonstrated behavioral changes that they attributed to LMET
exhibited these characteristics:
A strong desire to change their behavior
Felt they had room for improvement in leadership and management
Were more likely to be junior with some leadership experience
Returned directly to management positions after graduating
Had some initial success in practicing the competencies
An immediate superior or peer had served as good role model
They were more likely to be assigned to a command noted for its organizational
effectiveness and that stresses subordinate development
She recommended that LMET be continued and reinforced at the unit level
and that, through the HRM program, commands improve communication, stress
subordinate development, and improve problem solving techniques. [Ref. 22]
8. Glenn (1987)
Mike Glenn, a former Navy Organizational Effectiveness Consultant presently
working at Naval Training Systems Center in Norfolk, VA, is finishing a doctoral
dissertation on "Senior Management Perceptions of Actions to Support Post-Training
Utilization of (LMET)". Of specific concern to Mr. Glenn are the following:
Which management and supervisory actions in support of Job Linkage and
Follow-up 12 do senior Naval managers perceive to be important for their
subordinate managers; supervisors?
To what extent do senior Naval managers perceive that the important
management and supervisory actions in support of Job Linkage and Follow-up
are practiced in their organizations by their subordinate managers; supervisors.
[Ref. 23]
l
"Job Linkage and Follow-up refer to specific activities in this dissertation. Job
Linkage, as Glenn defines it, is re-entry of the trainee into the workplace. He defines
Follow-up as on-going support of learned behaviors on the job.
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He surveyed 106 Navy operational commands asking senior managers to rate
the importance of various actions which may be taken by management to support the
full use by personnel, on the job, of behaviors learned in LMET. He also asked them
to indicate whether they had ever observed each action in any organization and in their
present command. So far he has found that senior Navy managers believe assignment
of a role model (supervisor or co-worker), trainee goal setting for job performance, and
trainee environment are important to Job Linkage.
9. LMET Sites
At least two LMET sites are gathering data from Commanding Officers (COs)
of Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) attendees about six months after graduation. 13
Their purpose is to gauge whether the COs are pleased with the "results" of LMET.
Their questions include:
• Has the individual's leadership and management performance improved after
completing LMET?
• What improvements in performance if any have been seen since attending
LMET?
• What improvements have you seen in the work group?
One site found that about 64 percent of COs responding noticed an
improvement in the performance of graduates. The sample size is very small thus far
(n= 18), but the effort shows considerable promise in specifying what LMET does for
graduates and their commands.
10. Command Effectiveness Study (1985)
Although not specifically related to LMET, this study, done by McBer and
Co., turned from a focus on individual performance to characteristics distinguishing
superior from average commands. After identifying criteria/indicators of superior
command performance, a sample of outstanding and average operational commands
were observed, interviewed and surveyed.
Four survey instruments were used in the study:
• Navy Competency Assessment Profile (NCAP) - asked respondents to rate
themselves on the sixteen fleet competencies and whether they had attended
LMET.
13 Correspondence with LMET sites in Little Creek. VA and Mayport, FL,
revealed that earlier this year they began sending questionnaires to Commanding
Officer's of TAD attendees about six months after they graduated.
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• Command Information Questionnaire (CIQ) - replaced the NCAP in the second
phase of the study (84-85); asked people to rate their command on the
characteristics of superior commands identified in the first phase of the study
(1983)
• Systematic Multiple Level Observation of Groups (SYMLOG) - designed to
identify the dynamics of work groups in terms of the roles assumed by
individual group members
• Commitment Index - used as a supplement to the SYMLOG; assessed the level
of commitment personnel felt to their job and command
The reason given for replacement of the NCAP in the second phase of the
study was: "Although relevant to competencies, the NCAP results were not useful in
understanding differences between superior and average commands" [Ref. 25].
In a pilot test of the NCAP in 1983, 100 Navy enlisted personnel answered the
questionnaire. The conclusion was:
Although the overall competency rating scores did not differ significantly as a
function of LMET training, LMET-trained individuals were better able to
differentiate their abilities in using the competencies. Persons without LMET
training tended to rate themselves similarly on all 16 competencies. [Ref. 2: p.
50]
Despite the drawback of using a self assessment instrument such as the NCAP
to measure the effect of LVIET; these statements are supported by some of the studies
discussed previously.
The primary product of the Command Effectiveness Study was a model of an
organizational system whose "parts" are interrelated. These components have certain
characteristics which distinguish the superior organization from an average one. The
















Building Esprit de Corps
Training and Development
The results and lessons learned through the Command EfTectiveness Study
(CES) are the basis for the Command Effectiveness Seminar (also known as the
Command Excellence Seminar). CES results have also been incorporated into most of
the LMET courses. [Refs. 24,25]
11. Command Excellence Seminar Feedback Analysis (1987)
This Caliber Associates report summarizes an analysis of feedback (course
critique) sheets filled out by 215 Command Excellence Seminar attendees. The
objective of the report was to identify results related to improved mission readiness
experienced by seminar attendees by conducting a content analysis of two items from
the feedback sheets. These items asked the respondent to give examples where the
seminar helped them or their commands do the job better.
The responses were fairly homogeneous in that virtually everyone reported
some type of improved performance in, or greater awareness of some dimension o^
leadership. Overall, the report indicated that the Command Excellence Seminar is
beneficial. Participants responded enthusiastically and attribute considerable personal
success to the course. The data did not support any specific conclusions regarding
"outcomes" in the form of organizational impact from the course. This was due in part
to the lack of specificity in the feedback questions and exploratory nature of the
analysis. [Ref. 26]
12. Summary
What can be learned about the effectiveness of LMET from the studies
presented thus far? Training evaluation is often categorized into four types of
measures:
1) Participant Reactions
2) Evidence of Learning
3) Evidence of Behavioral Change and
4) Results in Operations (impact on organizational effectiveness). [Ref. 27]
a. Participant Reactions
In reading the studies discussed earlier and in corresponding with former
and current L.VIET instructors we found that students generally react positively to
LMET. Many have stated that they wish they could have attended earlier in their
careers.
b. Evidence of Learning
Pre and post-testing of students by SDC during their assessments of pilot
courses indicated that students were gaining expected knowledge levels. But Vandover
and Villarosa's [Ref. 20: p. 87] observation regarding deterioration of knowledge after
as little as six months leads one to conclude that much of the material learned is short-
lived.
c. Evidence of Behavioral Change
This was the primary focus of three of the Naval Postgraduate School
theses [Refs. 20,21,22]. None of them found a systematic link between LMET
attendance and improvement in leadership behavior. They were able to discover some
individual and organizational factors that intervene in behavioral changes. Glenn's
approach in his dissertation is to discover these factors through the perceptions of
senior managers [Ref. 23].
d. Results in Operations
As stated earlier, this ground is yet uncovered in LMET evaluation. There are a
number o^ reasons why such research has not been done yet, including:
• Lack of a "control group" (a command or unit completely unaffected by
LMET)
• No baseline research on effectiveness levels prior to LMET implementation
• Many uncontrolled intervening variables
• Instability of measures of effectiveness (MOEs).
B. STUDIES ON MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
How then can LMET be evaluated as to its effect on mission effectiveness and
readiness? The first step is to select criteria that reasonably represent mission
capability. Three studies in this area are presented from which several candidate
dependent variables have been gleaned.
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1. Horowitz (1986)
Dr. Horowitz found at least fifteen studies identifying quantitative links
between Manpower, Personnel, and Training (MPT) factors and unit performance.
Several of these studies address the payoff to training. He suggests such measures as:
• Operational Propulsion Plant Examinations (OPPEs)
• Operational Readiness Examinations(OREs)
• Selected Exercises (including live firing exercises)
• Excellence Awards (such as Battle Efficiency "E")
• Bombing scores (for aviation units)
• Air Combat Maneuvering Ranges
• Simulator performance
• Casualty Reports (CASREPs)
• Unit Status and Identify Reports (UNTTREPs)
• Board of Inspection and Survey (INSURV)
• Maintenance and Material Management (3M)
Dr. Horowitz found shortcomings among most of the measures yet he did not see them
as insurmountable barriers to research in the area of relating MPT factors and unit
MOE's. For example:
• Training exercises such as OREs and OPPEs are prepared for, and would
therefore reflect an "upper bound" on performance.
• For selected exercises failing grades may not be numerically recorded.
• Only one ship per squadron can be awarded the Battle "E".
• CASREPs and UNTTREPs are self-reported, not objective and criteria vary
widely among commands.
• 3M data suffers from reporting errors and differences from ship class to ship
class and over time. [Ref. 28]
2. Davilli and Schenzel (1986)
Davilli and Schenzel, two Naval Postgraduate School students, used Refresher
Training (REFTRA) ORE and Battle Problem scores as dependent variables in creating
Multiple Regression Models of the relationship between readiness and a number of
manpower, training, and other evaluative measures. They used a small sample of ships
(n = 44), however, and had to obtain much of the data by physically searching through
REFTRA files in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
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Assuming ORE is a universally accepted measure of readiness, Davilli and
Schenzel's results indicate a multivariate approach to predicting readiness is feasible.
The variables with the greatest predicting power (Beta coeficient and significance level)
in their model were billet vacancies at 90 days and 180 days prior to ORE. Variables
such as average drill periodicity, average school qualification, and average watch
qualification 30 days prior to ORE were poor predictors (low significance and Beta
coefficients, and (for one variable) the opposite sign than was expected). [Ref. 29]
3. Chatfield and Morrison (1987)
Researchers at NPRDC assessed the consistency and stability of 20 surface
ship measures of effectiveness from fiscal year 1982 to 1984 [Ref. 30]. Their purpose
was to create a pre-change baseline that could be used later in evaluating the effect of
the new Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) career path on readiness and performance.
They proposed using a multiple measure approach, assuming that no single measure
was an appropriate evaluation standard. The unit measures they looked at included:
PEB (Propulsion Examining Board)
PMS (Preventive Maintenance System)
NWTI (Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspection)
REFTRA (Refresher Training) Quick Look
Post-TRE (Training Readiness Evaluation)
CASREPs (Casualty Reports)
Personnel Retention
TRA (Training Readiness Assessment)
CSRT (Combat System Readiness Test)
Safety Inspection
Command Inspection (done by immediate superior command)
IXSURV
ARE (Aviation Readiness Evaluation)
Battle "E" competition
PQS (Personnel Qualification System)
L'MTREP
Chatfield and Morrison found that data on ship performance had poor year to
year stability and was inconsistent among different MOEs for the same ship. They
concluded that the measures were too unstable to use as a baseline for evaluating
policy revisions. They did not recommend collection or analysis of other measures as it
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would likely lead to similar results. Instead Chatfield and Morrison recommended
review and revision of MOEs to improve their reliability and validity.
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IV. METHODOLOGY
A. SELECTION OF VARIABLES
After reviewing the studies cited in chapter III and phone conversations with
type commander staff members about what the admirals look at in determining which
ships get the Battle "E", the following measures of shipboard effectiveness were
selected:





Supply Management Inspection ( S VI I ) results 16
Personnel retention rates 17
Because a secondary goal of this study was to create a framework for future
evaluation of LMET, variables were selected not only on the basis of face validity but
also on data availability and potential for quantification. The objective was to obtain
data on as many ships as possible through fairly routine reports and records.
C-rating is an overall status based on a composite of the unit's readiness in
four resource areas: 1) equipment and supplies on hand, 2) equipment condition, 3)
personnel, and 4) training. A rating of CI means the unit is fully combat ready, C2 -
substantially combat ready, C3 - marginally combat ready, C4 - not combat ready
[Ref. 31]. Ships which spent more than half the cycle in programmed overhaul or
conversion (C5) were not included. Any time the remaining ships spent in C5 was also
subtracted from the total before calculating the percentages.
13 Because verbal (ordinal) scores were supplied by type commanders these were
converted to equivalent (though somewhat arbitrary) numerical scores, i.e.,
unsatisfactory - 0, satisfactory - 1, outstanding - 2.
16 Supply Management Inspection results were also provided in verbal (ordinal)
terms and were converted in the same manner as REFTRA data: from a series of
verbal scores in certain inspection areas. On the advice of a former SMI team
member, the areas used to create an overall SMI score were: supply support, food
service, retail operations, and aviation supply support (for those ships with a separate
division for this purpose).
17Net retention rates over the entire 18 month cycle. Net rate equals the number
who reenlisted or extended divided by the total number eligible for reenlistment. The
rates were given for first term, second term, and career.
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The next logical step in the analysis was to measure the training itself. Since
there was no control group or baseline measure, the next best alternative was to
quantify LMET's existence in each unit. To do this one must know:
• Who was onboard each ship (a minimum of six of the eighteen months) in a
supervisory or management position (E5 or above)?
• Who, of the supervisors/managers, has had LMET and when did they attend?
From this information the following variables were gleaned:
• Percent of enlisted supervisors onboard for at least six months who had been to
LMET at least once
• Percent of officer personnel onboard for at least six months who had been to
LMET at least once
• Percent of both officer and enlisted supervisors who had attended LMET
• Average number of years since enlisted supervisors had attended LMET 18
• Average number of years since officer personnel had attended LMET
• Average number of years since both officer and enlisted supervisors had
attended LMET
Appendix A lists all variables used and the mean, minimum, maximum, and number of
ships reporting for each variable.
B. SCOPE
The sample consisted of 285 surface ships. This was all surface ships under
Commander Naval Surface Forces, Atlantic and Pacific, less those who were in
overhaul or other programmed repair more than half of the eighteen month cycle
(January 1985 - June 1986). The eighteen month period chosen is the latest complete
competitive cycle.
Since MOEs differ so much among surface, aviation, submarine, and shore
activities, it was decided that the analysis should be limited to only the surface
community in this preliminary study.
18 Since the first LMET courses were taught in 1978, for those who had never
attended, their "years since attendance" was set at eight years. The maximum number
of years since attending could not be greater than seven (1985 - 1978) for those who
had attended. Eight years was chosen so as not to give non-attendance too much
weight in this variable.
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C. DATA SOURCES
Chief of Naval Operations (OP-64) supplied a tape of C-ratings and
corresponding dates for all surface ships. 19 The remaining data on MOEs were
collected from type commanders (Commander Naval Surface Forces, Atlantic and
Pacific). A list of Unit Identification Codes (UTCs) was supplied to Defense
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) which in turn provided a tape containing social
security numbers of all E5s and above onboard these ships who show up on at least
three quarterly manpower reports. This tape was forwarded to Naval Education and
Training Command (CNET) in Pensacola, FL where the social security numbers were
matched with Navy Integrated Training Resources Administrative System (NTTRAS)
files of LMET graduates providing data on who had attended LMET and when they
attended. Courses numbers and titles supplied to CNET are listed in Appendix B.
DMDC cleansed the data of cases in which an individual had attended a school which
did not include LMET during the time he/she attended and grouped the data by unit
yielding the LMET variables discussed earlier. Further information regarding the data
received from NTTRAS is included in Appendices C and D.
D. ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE
Because so many variables affecting each ship's readiness and performance are
unknown or unavailable, statistical techniques and conclusions are limited to describing
hypothetical association between LMET and effectiveness. To estimate the degree of
association between LMET variables and MOE variables, the Spearman Coefficient of
Rank Correlation (p
s
x was computed. Like other measures of correlation, p s varies
from -1 (a perfect negative relationship between two variables) to +1 (a perfect
positive relationship between two variables). This non-parametric test was chosen
because of the ordinal nature of much of our data and the unsuitability of the data for
more classical procedures (randomness, normal distribution, independent observations,
etc.). [Ref. 32]
This method of analysis does not lend itself to profound conclusions regarding
LMET's effect on unit performance or combat readiness. However this preliminary
study is considered to be the first step in designing and testing a model for LMET
evaluation against unit effectiveness criteria.
19The information obtained on C-ratings was classified "Secret".




Results of Spearman's Rho Rank Correlation tests are shown in Tables 2 and 3.
They are separated by fleet because of the often extreme differences in scoring,
reporting, and standards between the fleets. In fact correlation between many of the
variables and fleet was significantly high (p s ranged from .0009 to .4309). Eight out of
eighteen were significant at the a = .05 level.
In interpreting the results of this correlation, as listed in Tables 2 and 3. one
must use caution. First, what do the numbers themselves mean?
The top number is the coefficient of correlation (p g\ which ranges from negative
one (-1) to positive one (+1). This p s measures the strength of the relationship
between the two variables adjacent to it in the matrix. A p s of negative one would
indicate perfect negative correlation between the two variables, i.e., as one variable
increases the other always decreases. While a p
s
of positive one would indicate that
ships with high values in one variable also possess high values of the other variable.
Such extreme values then indicate the strongest possible relationships between
variables. A p. closer to zero (0) tends to show a weaker relationship between
variables, with zero indicating no relationship between the variables. [Ref. 32: p 562]
The second number in each of the "cells" of Tables 2 and 3 indicates the number
of cases available to compute that particular p s value. This figure ranges from 24, in
the case of the number of ships in the Pacific Fleet for which OPPE scores were
available, to 153, the total number of ships in the study from the Atlantic Fleet. As is
obvious in observing these figures, not all ships had scores or other measures available
for this study. This variation in number of ships sampled for any given
inspection/examination reflects differing operating schedules, availability of inspection
teams, emergent fleet requirements (which occasionally require cancellation or
rescheduling of inspections), and other factors beyond the scope of this study.
The third and final statistic captured in each "cell" of the matrices in Tables 2
and 3 is significance level. This provides the reader an estimate of whether the
relationship indicated by p is probably due to chance or some systematic relationship
between the two variables tested. Significance levels as shown in the tables indicate the
likelihood that the relationship is merely due to chance, therefore values closer to zero
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allow the researcher to reject the null hypothesis (that the two variables are unrelated)
and conclude that the two variables are related.
Once it appears that the two variables are related to each other, the sign (-or +
)
of p s should be reexamined. This is the point at which extreme caution should be
taken with regard to interpretation. Many of the variables indicate poorer performance
as their values increase. For example, "percent time in C-4 (not combat ready)" - as it
increases, readiness of the ship decreases; "average years since attending LMET" - as
this value increases, the LMET training (if any) of personnel onboard is "rustier".
A. ATLANTIC FLEET RESULTS
Only two of the measures of effectiveness have a significant correlation (at the
a=.05 level) with any of the LMET variables. These are 3M scores and first term
retention rates. The 3M scores show a relationship to the percentage of LMET
graduates, both enlisted and officer, but in opposite directions. Specifically, as shown
in Table 2, the scores on 3M inspections are negatively related to the percentage of
enlisted personnel who had attended one or more LMET courses. This is shown by
the p s of -.2093. However, 3M inspections scores were positively correlated with the
percentage of officers with LMET training (p s = .1940).
Interestingly, if one expands consideration to significance at the a = .10 level,
this same trend is noticed in correlations between 3M and average time since attending
LMET. Here the signs of the coefficients are reversed (positive for enlisted, negative
for officers) because of the "reverse" nature of the "Average yr since LMET" variable.
The coefficient for enlisted years since attending LMET (.1904) indicates that as the
number of years since attending LMET increases (to a maximum of eight per person),
the scores on 3M inspections tend to increase. Conversely, the coefficient for officer
years since attending LMET (-.1903) indicates that as the average number of years
since attending LMET increases, the scores on 3M inspections tend to decrease. In
other words, it appears as though those ships which have, on average, more recent
enlisted graduates of LMET tend to attain lower scores on 3M inspections; whereas
ships which have, on average, more recent officer graduates of LMET tend to attain
higher scores on 3M inspections.
"First Term Retention" was the only other MOE to correlate significantly with
any of the LMET variables. The percentage of officers who had attended LMET was
positively correlated with first term retention rates. Those ships which had higher
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percentages of officers who had attended at least one LMET course tended to have
higher rates of retention of first-term personnel. Reinforcing this finding is the
negative p s between first term retention and average years since attendance for officers.
B. PACIFIC FLEET RESULTS
There were more significantly related measures for Pacific Fleet ships than for the
Atlantic Fleet, however, the results were mixed. Some significant relationships between
the C-rating indicators of readiness and LMET attendance were found. What the
results show is that the percent of time ships spent in categories C-l and C-2 is
negatively related to the percent of officers with LMET. To some extent, percent time
in C-2 is also negatively correlated with percent of enlisted personnel with LMET
training. This can be interpreted to mean that as the percentage of officer personnel
with LMET increases the percent time that the ship is either fully or substantially
combat ready decreases. This general trend is continued with significant positive
correlations between percentages of LMET trained officer personnel and percent time
spent in C-3 and C-4 (marginally and not combat ready). These results are contrary to
expected improvements in readiness as a result of LMET training of personnel. As one
might expect "Average yr since LMET - Officers" and"Average yr since LMET - Both"
were also significantly correlated (with opposite signs due to the "reverse" nature of the
variables) to C-rating variables (with the exception of "% Time in C-l").
Other measures of effectiveness which correlate significantly with LMET
attendance include first term retention, second term retention and career retention.
These variables were negatively correlated with "Percent Enlisted w/LMET" and
positively correlated with "Average yr since LMET - Enlisted" (although not
significantly for "First Term Retention"). To interpret this: those ships which had
higher retention tended to have fewer LMET trained enlisted personnel. Those ships
with higher retention also had a higher average number of years since their enlisted
personnel had attended LMET (this average is also affected by setting the number of
years since attendance to eight for people who had never attended).
C. SUMMARY
As shown in Tables 1 and 2, the majority of "cells" did not indicate a significant
relationship between MOE and LMET variables. In fact, correlations which did
appear significant were not present in both fleets. Many of the significant correlations
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were counterintuitive and so deserve closer scrutiny. Results were, at best, mixed and
did not point to any strong relationships between LMET and fleet effectiveness;
although weak relationships were shown for some measures—usually on the order of p
s
=
.19 to .27. These results can lead to tempered conclusions and several suggestions
for improved research in the area of LMET evaluation and fleet measures of
effectiveness.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
There is a measurable relationship between LMET and several fleet MOEs,
however, this relationship was not consistent in both fleets and was mixed or
counterintuitive in some cases. For the Atlantic Fleet, only two measures had
significant relationships to any LMET variables--3M inspection scores and first term
retention. The relationships were opposite for officer and enlisted LMET, the latter
having a counterintuitive relationship with 3M.
For the Pacific Fleet ships, there were many more significant relationships, but
they were primarily in two areas: C-ratings and retention. Once again the results were
often the opposite expected-the more time the ship spent in C-l or C-2 (combat ready
or substantially combat ready), the fewer personnel had attended LMET. Officer
LMET did correlate positively with career retention indicating some benefit from
LMET.
Why were the relationships between LMET and fleet effectiveness scant and in
some respects, counterintuitive? There are several possibilities:
• The data on LMET attendance may not be accurate. The system for reporting
course attendance to NITRAS contains a number of "holes" and "bugs" leading
to a reputation for unreliable data, especially with regard to older data (LMET
records were scanned as far back as 1978, when the course was first taught).
• The data on measures of effectiveness lack clear reliability and validity. High
year to year variability and instability of ship performance measures were found
by Chatfield and Morrison of NPRDC [Ref. 30]. Some measures used could be
considered parochial (OPPE, SMI) and thus were not truly indicative of
shipwide performance.
• LMET may not be having the desired effect on attendees' subsequent
performance. It may in fact be counterproductive.
• LMET may sensitize graduates to imperfections in the fleet environment
causing them to be less likely to reenlist (see Chapter V, Table 2).
• Competencies and behaviors learned in LMET may not be reinforced
(rewarded) in the fleet. Behaviors not at least intermittently rewarded (through
recognition and approval) tend to extinguish rapidly. No measure of degree of
command support for LMET could be made. Only the number of people in
each command with LMET was measured--not the extent to which LMET
competency use is rewarded and reinforced. As stated by George Eggert in an
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article on management development, "It is unwise to 'develop' behavior in
training programs that will not be reinforced back on the job" [Ref. 33]
• Selection bias regarding who attends LMET (especially TAD) may be occuring.
Supervisors and department heads might tend to send those whom the ship can
best afford to lose for two weeks rather than reward their best performeres with
two weeks of leadership training. LMET may also be given to higher
propertions of junior versus senior supervisors.
• Sending people TAD to LMET may leave those ships who send more personnel
shorthanded, temporarily compromising readiness.
• The differences in the results for the Pacific and Atlantic Fleets may reflect
variation in:
* inspection standards and differences in inspection teams
* operation schedules and missions
* frequency o^ inspections, drills, and distinguished visitors
* reporting methods and criteria
* Fleet "climate" (prevailing attitudes and priorities)
* LMET sites, instructors, etc. (East vs. West Coast)
Though essentially speculative, the possible reasons behind the trends in the data
point to a need for further evaluation. Not only should the method and content of
LMET be examined but also the methods by which the Navy measures the
effectiveness of its fleets.
The ultimate standard that must be used in judging the usefulness of any
organizational program is whether or not that program is making an impact on "the
bottom line." For the U.S. Navy, the bottom line is not a profit figure, but something
called readiness or effectiveness. Measuring this effectiveness is something the Navy
attempts to do in many ways-only a few of which were included in this study. These
data are collected for a myriad of purposes among which are:
• to insure units are meeting minimum standards
• to aid in operational planning
• to gauge whether a unit is prepared for deployment or operational assignments
• to provide input for unit awards
Often secondary uses of the information, such as input to the Commanding
Officer's fitness report or unit award nominations, can obstruct the accurate
recording reporting of data. Inspections often become an end unto themselves. The
objective becomes-passing the inspection-instead of maximizing overall effectiveness
and capability. A CO may delay the transfer of key supervisors onboard until after a
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major inspection and then lose a substantial proportion of his key people just prior to
deployment. Many ships use their "first teams" for inspection/ training drills as much
as possible allowing other watch sections to lag in their proficiency.
All of the measures available for this thesis have at least some limitations ranging
from inconsistent reporting methods, to ship to ship differences in standards, to
inflation of grades, to "fudged" reports. Even the data regarding LMET attendance are
regarded as potentially unreliable-probably in the direction of not including everyone
who had attended LMET (the technicians at NITRAS could not assure the authors
that all LMET attendance had been recorded for all courses since 1978).
Some additional considerations and limitations in applying and interpreting the
results of this study:
• The technical nature of 3M inspections and OPPEs-these measures are
influenced by the seniority and skill of personnel in certain
divisions/departments.
• Wide variation in ship type which in turn means differences in mission,
operational schedule, homeport, command climate, etc.
• Variations in ships' age, maintenance status, and crew mix (senior/junior,
officer/enlisted)
• No control group-as Davies mentioned, the Navy's policy is not to
systematically deny LMET training to any targeted group [Ref. 19] In fact
Navy policy is to send all personnel headed for sea duty to LMET (see chapter
I).
• The results of past studies regarding LMET effects on behavior change
[Refs. 20,21,22] indicated no systematic relationship between LMET and
improved leader performance.
The LMET program has gone unevaluated with regard to its effect on
operational unit performance for nearly ten years now. To date (including this study)
no clue has been found that the training helped a single ship. If nothing else, this
study should provoke more extensive efforts to evaluate LMET against effectiveness
measures on a Navywide basis.
B, RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Improvements to LMET
The following recommendations for improvements to LMET are based primarily on
literature review:
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Continue current efforts to include aspects of the Model for Command
Effectiveness [Ref. 24] in LMET curricula. This will give the LMET graduate
more of a "systems'" view of an organization-how the components and forces
within and external to the organization interact and impact upon the overall
effectiveness of the unit.
Make further efforts to tailor the courses to the developmental needs of officers
and NCOs to the stage (early or mid-career) and to the field (warfare or staff
community).
Instructors should be closely screened. They should be volunteers, have
superior training facilitation skills, and be proven in leadership performance.
This recommendation may be difficult to implement given the reputation of
LMET and HRM billets as "not career enhancing".
Reexamine the methodology-Does LMET include the best known state of the
art methods for teaching the objectives of LMET? If time is limited are
learning objectives prioritized and the most effort spent on the most
important/difficult areas.
Given improvements in LMET delivery and content over the last few years,
provide more opportunities for attendance by NCO's. Officer training has been
systematically included in the transfer, training pipeline (SWOS Basic, SWOS
Department Head School, PCO/PXO School). Soon, if not already, many
officers will have received LMET at all three levels—not as a redundant course,
but at appropriate depth and emphasis for each target group. Enlisted
supervisors in this study received LMET in consistently lower proportions than
their officer counterparts.
One promising program is the "mobile" LMET team that can perform the
training for all levels (in appropriate groups) within a single unit. The teams
are often able to incorporate unit specific issues into the course. This technique
may be one of the best methods for achieving "critical mass" [Ref. 23], a
sufficient proportion of LMET trained supervisors within the unit to assure
agreement and support of LMET competencies.
2. Areas for Future Research
By sampling a smaller number of commands and collecting data directly from
the ships, research can be conducted at several levels, e.g., LPO, LCPO, Junior
Officer, Senior Officer. Also this approach might allow breakouts of the data
by departments or even work centers and individual ratings. A smaller sample
might also allow the use of measures in addition to those studied here which are
only available at the unit level such as departmental drill performance,
underway hours, and inspection comments, and individual performance data.
Select a smaller sample of "excellent" and "average" commands based on criteria
such as these used in the Command Excellence Study [Ref. 24] and perform an
analysis of variance to determine whether the level of LMET training is
different between the two groups.
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• Use other Measures of Effectiveness in a similar study:
* Monthly Training Reports
* PQS accomplishment
* Departmental Excellence Awards
* INSURV
* NWTI (Nuclear Weapons Technical Inspections)
• Develop a control group--a group of ships on which no members have had
LMET; then measure their accomplishments over a period of time compared to
similar ships with LMET trained personnel.
• Expand the study to other Navy communities—aviation, submarine, special
warfare, shore, etc.
• The authors also agree with and offer several recommendations made by
Chatfield and Morrison regarding Navy MOEs:
* Commit resources for improving measures of readiness and develop new,
carefully constructed indices of ship readiness.
* Measures should assess true operational readiness rather than
administrative procedures and equipment status.
* Assessments should be perceived to contribute to the capability of the unit
and not as inspections for inspection's sake.
* Centralize and automate all readiness rating recording and analysis.
Eliminate redundancy and weight measures according to their importance
to the fleet.
* Use only external assessment teams or individuals.
* "Surprise" inspections should be random and live up to their name.
* Standardize the content, administration, and analysis of assessments.
[Ref. 30]
• Leadership training should be included in studies using multivariate models to
predict organizational effectiveness and productivity.
• Experimentation regarding what the optimum form of LMET is: maximum
benefit to cost ratio, optimal career points for training, optimum course length
for each career point.
• Implement surveys of TAD graduates' COs at all LMET sites (see Chapter III,
LMET sites)
C. SUMMARY
The Navy, like other military' organizations, faces complex leadership problems
and therefore complex training issues. Leaders must be capable of converting their
methods and styles to combat situations as quickly as the need arises. Navy
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supervisors must cope with a variety of challenges including increased technology;
smarter, more capable, but fewer sailors; and fast paced changes in the operating
environment. Leadership and management tasks are occupying more than half the
time of most personnel above the grade of E-6. Shouldn't leadership and management
training be given a higher priority given its relative domination of NCOs' and Officers'
time?
Joseph Olmstead, in a 1980 report on leadership training, said this in conclusion
about leadership training:
Without a doubt, the quality of available leadership at all levels determines the
character of an organization and the effectiveness with which it accomplishes its
objectives. Accordingly, the development ol~ individuals who occupy leadership
positions is one of the most critical functions in any organization.
Although difficult when conducted properly, effective training for leadership is
feasible. Despite the fact that the field is in a state of disarray and many
programs are not very effective, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that
leadership can be taught when training is sincerely deemed important by





LMET Variables Mean* Minimum Maximum N
% Enlisted w LMET 42 21 66 285
% Officers w/LMET 79 33 100 285
% Both w/LMET 48 28 65 285
Average years since 5.5 4 7 285
attending LMET - Enlisted
Average years since 3.3 1 6 285
attending LMET - Officers
Average years since 5.1 4 7 285
attending LMET - Both
MOE Variables Mean* Minimum Maximum N
Percent time in C-l ** ** ** 285
Percent time in C-2 ** ** ** 285
Percent time in C-3 ** ** ** 285
Percent time in C-4 ** ** ** 285
3M Inspection Scores 87 65 98 220
Refresher Training Scores 1.2 0.0 2.0 132
Operational Propulsion .63 0.0 2.0 122
Plant Exam Results
Supply Management 2.8 1.0 4.0 123
Inspection Results
First Term Retention .50 .00 1.00 272
Second Term Retention .68 .00 1.33*** 270
Career Retention .78 .00 1.10*** 269
*The reader should be cautioned that mean values for variables that are either already
expressed as an average or proportion/percentage can not be interpreted as the fleet
average for that variable, but rather the arithmetic mean of the entries for all ships.
**Withheld due to classification of source data
*** Retention figures greater than one are possible when an individual reenlists prior to
their "eligibility window" creating a situation where more persons reenlist extend than
were counted as "eligible for reenlistment".
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APPENDIX B
COURSE NUMBERS USED TO DETERMINE LMET ATTENDANCE
Course Number Course Name Yrs in effect'
A-012-0037 Recruit Company Commander 1983-1985
A-0 12-0045 LMET Instructor NA
A-4H-0107 SWOS Department Head 1978-1982
A-4H-0111 Prospective Commanding Officer 1978-1985
A-4H-0112 Prospective Executive Officer 1978-1985
A-4H-0118 SWOS Basic 1978-1985
A-500-0033 BT MM Six Year Obligor LMET NA
A-500-0034 LMET for Leading Petty Officers NA
A-500-0036 LMET for Leading Chief Petty Officers NA
A-7C-0022 LMET for Division Officers NA
A-7C-0025 LMET for Aviation Division Officers NA
A-8B-0012 Supply Corps Officer Basic 1978-1985
P-00-4302 Officer Indoctrination School 1981-1985
* Indicated only for courses that were not strictly LMET courses
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APPENDIX C









BT/MM Six Year Obligor LMET
LMET for Leading Petty Officers
LMET for Leading Chief Petty Officers
LMET for Division Officers
LMET for Aviation Division Officers
Supply Corps Officer Basic
Officer Indoctrination School
Of those who attended LMET 88.2 percent attended only one course; 10.2
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